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Abstract 
Purpose: This paper examines the puzzles of “ownership”, the legal and psychological 
commitment of directors, through the experience of the work of boards at non-profit 
organisations. 
Design/Methodology/Approach: An exploration of the literature on charity governance 
leads to a first-person reflection on the tensions in directing two common types of non-profit 
organisations. 
Findings: In the UK as in other countries, charities are companies, bound by company law 
as well as regulatory constraints of the non-profit sector. This creates responsibilities of 
ownership without the material benefits. In contrast to corporate share ownership, a sense of 
psychological ownership may pre-date appointment as a director, facilitating stewardship 
behaviour, facilitating stewardship and accountability. 
Research implications: This paper calls for expanded empirical work on boards of non-
profit organisations, giving a focused agenda of aspects to highlight the differences between 
charities and the corporate sector. 
Practical implications: The focus on psychological ownership can influence recruitment, 
induction and organisation of the work of charity boards, helping to ease resource deficits. 
Social implications: With pressure mounting in deliver of public services, the charity sector 
needs to fill growing gaps in provision. The constitution of boards plays a valuable role. 
Originality/Value: By incorporating psychological ownership in a framework of 
accountability, this paper points towards both a research agenda and practical considerations 
for charity boards. 
Keywords: Charity boards, non-profit organisations, directors, trustees, corporate 
governance  
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Introduction 
In recent years, charities in the UK have laboured under a cloud and in a spotlight. The 
spotlight came in early 2018, when one of the largest charities in the country, Oxfam, faced 
allegations in a television documentary of sexual abuse by senior members of its relief teams 
working in fragile environments, including Haiti. They were exploiting people they had been 
sent to help. The cloud was closer to home. The social care sector – including the large trust 
whose board I had just joined as chair – was shocked by several cases in 2011-13 of abuse in 
homes and hospitals for elderly people or others with learning disabilities and mental health 
problems. The operators involved were not charities, but the sector includes many charitable 
organisations, including some quite large ones.  
These cases galvanised concern about governance in charities. At Oxfam, the allegations 
stemmed from work in 2011. Oxfam had initially investigated them but said nothing and did 
seemingly little. What did senior management know, and when did they know it. Where was 
the board?i In the care sector, what had the regulators been doing? Why did it take a television 
documentary to highlight the problem? Could residents and families of other care homes, 
including those in the charitable sector, count on boards of those organisations?  Might 
charities working in lower-profile sectors also be affected?  
This “viewpoint” article, a personal interpretation, begins with a seemingly trivial incident 
but one that begs larger governance questions. As a practitioner, I write in first person, 
impelled by the personal, even visceral feelings that prompted it. As a scholar, I take a licence 
to adopt this stance from recent calls from editors of management journals to explore new 
approaches to answer unresolved issues (e.g. Barley, 2016; Suddaby, 2019; Vince & Hibbert, 
2018).  
I seek to articulate, though not to resolve, the puzzle of who “owns” a charity, not merely 
legally, but also in the psychological sense. The paper concludes with observations of a 
practical sense, thinking out loud about what director/trustees can do, even in absence of hard 
evidence or even reasonable theory.ii Let us look, then, at a small puzzle in charity governance 
and hold it unfolds into something larger. 
The first day, the first puzzle 
It was my first day as chair of the board of a charity, one classified as “major” in the 
British system – and my first day as a trustee of any charity. I was confronted with an issue I 
had not anticipated. Through an oversight, several former directors were still “members” of 
the company, a quaint British term in company law signifying legal ownership. Under the 
articles of association, we would need to provide them an annual report and invite them to an 
annual meeting. If they stood down, we could do away with annual meetings. Then only 
current trustees would be “members” and any board meeting would serve the purpose. Few 
charities, I was assured, have members other than the trustees. If the board asked non-director 
members to stand down, it would be my duty to explain the reason. Could we simply dismiss 
them? What would I like to do? 
As a corporate governance scholar, I appreciate the peculiarity of “members”. The 
designation dates back centuries, before corporations had limited liability and when most large 
businesses operated as partnerships. Members then sat on the board. In contemporary usage, 
however, it refers to the role played by shareholders, the top layer in a hierarchy of 
accountability (cf. Belyea, 2013). Members elect directors and approve the accounts. In 
normal companies, they also enjoy residual property rights, a benefit the members of charities 
do not share.  
Boards of directors – or of trusteesiii – are the next tier. They are accountable to “members” 
and are legally responsible and personally liable for the affairs of the company. In charity law, 
trustees may take no material benefit from the organisation. If the trustees are the only 
members, while their ownership responsibilities are high, their rights are few – they elect and 
dismiss their peers. 
When you become director of a company, especially as chair, you suddenly realise that 
the livelihoods of perhaps a thousand people and the lives of just as many vulnerable people 
depend on your decisions. How could you know what it feels like to be accountable only to 
the other member-director-trustees who are now looking to you for guidance?  
That first day-in-the-boardroom sets out the puzzle of this paper: Who is in charge, 
practically, not just in law? Boards hold managers to account, yes, but who holds directors 
accountable? In public, for-profit companies, shareholders appoint directors and can sue them 
when something goes wrong. Who sues charity directors?  
The question of “in whose interest” is articulated in regulation. The charity serves the 
interest of beneficiaries, not donors or directors. But that blurs the distinction between formal 
institutional arrangements and how it works in practice. Take this setting, social care: What 
happens when beneficiaries are people unable to exercise judgement over their affairs, when 
the directors are de facto and sometimes even de jure their guardians?  
If the answer is the regulators, then that just pushes accountability out of the organisation 
and a long way from day-to-day activities and information flows. What the philosopher Onora 
O'Neill (2002) calls “intelligent” accountability needs to be closer to home. Who – or what – 
makes a trustee-director accountable?  
These were questions – with legal, moral, psychological, sociological and perhaps even 
economic facets – I had not fully anticipated. I had an uncomfortable feeling in my stomach, 
as well as cognitive dissonance. This essay explores that gut reaction and mental noise, by 
looking at what the literature of charity governance has already examined, and what law and 
regulation do and how that might account for the differences between normal companies and 
this strange variant.  
To do so it draws upon two common types of charitable enterprises: Let’s call them “care” 
and “arts” (see Table 1). These are the two most common types of charity in Britain and have 
the greatest income.iv As it happens, I serve on two charity boards, one of each type. This 
classification does not arise from a well-researched typology of charities. There are many 
others, but these two are large types; they encapsulate issues the others face. Both address 
instances of market failure, though with different implications; one stems from personal 
anguish, while the other is fun.  
 
Table 1 - 'Care' and 'arts': similarities and differences 
 “Care” archetype “Arts” archetype 
Form Company limited by 
guarantee 
Company limited by 
guarantee 
Members Typically, trustees Typically, trustees 
Trustees Typically, people with some 
connection to the care 
Typically, people with 
interest in the art form 
Beneficiaries Service users, those who 
need care 
Two types: artists and 
audiences, who serve each 
other 
Sources of funding Local government, health 
service 
Local government, national 
agencies, corporate and 
personal donors 
Purpose Address market failure 
arising from disability of 
beneficiary to engage in 
market 
Address market failure 
arising from imbalances in 




Overwhelmingly charitable Mix, often dominantly 
commercial 
 
This discussion is situated in UK, and more specifically in English law. Aspects of it will 
differ in other jurisdictions, but probably more in the detail than in principle-level lessons. 
After a brief overview of two main and contradictory perspectives on governance, we will 
consider the (or, more precisely, my) experience of the strange limbo of charity the board 
membership. The paper concludes with reflections of what we do not know about charities 
and how we might understand to find out more. 
Governance layers 
“Governance” is a slippery term. The Cadbury Code (1992), which articulated corporate 
governance in the UK and became a model for codes around the world, defines corporate 
governance as “the system by which companies are directed and controlled”. Gourevitch and 
Shinn (2005) call it “the authority structure of a firm”, while Perrow (2002) sees governance 
as defining “property relations”.  
While much charity-governance research has focused narrowly on boards, the situation 
within charities is more complex than the literature suggests, as Cornforth (2012) explains. As 
with listed companies, charity governance comes in multiple layers, and these two types differ 
in important ways. Both work in markets, the structure and dynamics of which shape their 
freedom of action. Arguably, the purpose of the charity sector is to provide services in cases 
of market failure (Payton & Moody, 2008). To neo-liberal economists, however, market 
failure is also the main justification of the state, so are charities the solution to state failure? 
The terms “market failure” and “property relations” that governance arrangements concern are 
abstractions. They reduce complexities and take us a long way from the task – providing 
support for people in one form of need or another, which seem not to be met in other ways, 
and which have benefits for society at large.  
Such organisations compete for government grants or service-delivery contracts, with 
incentives to create value through efficiency or product/service development. But even 
markets that do not fail are less than perfect. So, it is even less surprising for charities, 
compared to corporations, that governance through market forces is less than perfect.v  
Organisations typically interact with four types of markets: supplies, labour, capital and 
goods/services. Most are similar in character across public, private and third sectors, with the 
notable exception that charities. To address market failure in goods and services and 
inelasticity in supplies, they often depend on non-market access to capital (e.g. grants and 
donations) and non- or sub-market access to labour (e.g. volunteers, potential earning 
sacrifices), while escaping the social contribution of taxation on any surpluses generated.  
Other layers include law and regulation. On the statutory side, both charitable and ordinary 
companies must all comply with the Companies Act and other civil and criminal laws and the 
additional provision of charity law. Company law articulates rules of formation, conduct and 
dissolution, and importantly the duty of directors. This works at a high-level, a blunt 
instrument of governance, open to much interpretation. 
Regulation then takes over, limiting interpretation. Many sectors are regulated, with the 
strength of oversight broadly proportional to the prospect of social harm and power 
imbalances. Utilities attract much regulation; so too banking, and public hazards like waste 
management. Health and social care attract high levels of oversight on the grounds that 
beneficiaries are vulnerable because of both personal incapacity and information asymmetries.  
Such services might be undertaken by other forms of organisations. Private, for-profit 
service providers take a lot of outsourced government business, but they avoid sectors where 
the extent of market failure is especially pronounced. Social enterprises – for-profit but not 
profit-focused companies – are another possibility. Britain’s community interest companies 
(CICs) are often called hybrids, like “benefit corporations” in the United States (Battilana, 
Sengul, Anne-Claire, & Model, 2015). CICs and other hybrids are a relatively new corporate 
form in Britain, with protection for directors from certain types of shareholder actions when 
directors pursue activities that do not contribute directly to shareholder value. Such firms 
operate under a logic, normally articulated in their founding documents, that calls on owners 
to sacrifice rights for the sake of community betterment.  
Elaborating the model for corporations in Nordberg (2011, Chapter 4), these different 
types of organisations have layers of governance arrangements. Some are external, including 
pressure from different types of markets (product-service, labour, supplies, etc.), from law and 
regulation; others are internal (owners, boards); and sector-based voluntary codes of practice. 
These governance layers constrain the organisations to differing degrees, indicated in Table 2 
by the description of their power (in italics).  
Community interest companies and conventional corporations work in fields where power 
relationships are favourable and markets function well. If we look at social care, private firms 
developed their business models on two trends: an ageing population, pointing to demand 
growth, especially among the well-off in society; and rising real estate values, pointing to 
capital appreciation. This model worked well until supply caught up with demand and growth 
of property prices slowed. The squeeze on profits led to lapses in service quality of the type 
that created the cloud over the sector. 
 
Table 2 - Governance layers in organization types and their power 
Governance 
layer  Charity (care) Charity (arts) 
Community 
interest 
companies (CIC) Corporation 
Market for 
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Not all social care providers can adopt that model, however. Cases where market failure 
is most acute and property relations are least clear offer little if any incentive to for-profit 
private firms or hybrids. People with physical and learning disabilities or mental health issues 
need more specialised care. They represent a poor market opportunity. Here is where charities 
operate. Because the markets they operate in mainly in failure, the state is often the customer, 
and its buying power is particularly great. Charities face an absence of alternative buyers and 
power over suppliers. Labour costs are under pressure, as charities compete with the state (in 
Britain, the National Health Service) for professionals, while support workers may earn nearly 
as much in less stressful roles. These pressures are mitigated in part by the desire of individuals 
to care for others: that is, they often have intrinsic motivation. Margins are tight, which 
matches a not-for-profit business, at least until there is a structural downturn (or a pandemic), 
when the business itself becomes vulnerable.  
In the arts, power relationships differ, as does the relationship with the state. Customers 
are many, but so too are alternatives for discretionary spend. Yet the appetite in many cases 
cannot match the cost of production, so the state steps in as donor, rather than customer, 
making grants to arts organisations to fill the gap between revenue and cost. Other, private 
donors may also make up the difference. They are often believers, and so have intrinsic 
motivation. Labour costs are mitigated by the intrinsic motivations of the creators and the lack 
of other outlets.  
While law sits in the background most of the time, and codes are voluntary, regulatory 
oversight is also strong, though to differing degrees. Charities serving the most vulnerable (i.e. 
“care”) are generally more tightly monitored than those serving people who need help to 
engage in a market (i.e. “arts”). These external layers of governance prescribe the boundaries 
of board discretion. This leads us to an internal layer, boards, and then back to “ownership” 
and how that seems to work in the charitable sector. 
Charity boards  
Regulation is insufficiently granular to monitor and support the work of organisations. 
That is the role of boards. Charities empanel directors for the same reasons that corporations 
do. First, they want advice from outsiders, with knowledge of different sectors and different 
skills. Second, they need a mechanism of accountability. Enjolras (2009) gives a generally 
positive account of the ways that boards of voluntary organisations deal with checks and 
balances, control procedures and incentives for collective action. And yet governance of non-
profit and voluntary organisations is often problematic (Cornforth, 2001).  
In their US-based study, Harris, Petrovits, and Yetman (2017) found that strong boards 
helped, but that accountabilities outside the board were more closely associated with lower 
incidences of fraud. In Britain, Abdullah, Khadaroo, and Napier (2018) found that years of 
government austerity led to creeping use of business language in governing charitable arts 
organisations, but does it bring with it the risk of mission creep? 
There are a variety of forms of charities in the UK. Trusts and associations tend to be 
smaller entities, and they are not considered legal personalities; most substantial entities use a 
“company” form, though more recent ones take advantage of the less complex legal form of 
the Charitable Interest Organisation (CIO). For simplicity, let us focus on “charitable 
companies”.  
Charities are just like other companies, until they aren’t. In UK law, they are often 
companies “limited by guarantee”, with no paid-in share capital. Members merely guarantee 
to contribute a nominal amount (£1.00) should the company need it. Directors have unlimited, 
personal liability, however, though courts tend to enforce it only in cases of fraudulent trading. 
In law, directors of charitable companies, as trustees, are not allowed to benefit directly 
from the charity itself. Traditionally, these positions have been held by unpaid individuals who 
oversee the work of those paid to undertake charitable activities. While changes in law now 
permit charitable companies to pay a director’s fee, the practice is still rare and subject to 
regulatory approval. As a result, directors are unlikely to be motivated directly by their 
(non)remuneration.   
Moreover, charity boards differ from those in British listed companies in an important 
way. Listed companies – and companies in general – have unitary boards, where executives 
sit alongside non-executive directors. Such boards are associated with collaborative action, 
emphasising the “service” role of directors (Hillman, Nicholson, & Shropshire, 2008). They 
run the risk that non-executives will be “captured” and pay insufficient attention to their 
“control” responsibilities (analogous to regulatory capture; cf. Baker, 2010). Nonetheless they 
have been strongly defended by corporations and investors alike during the 1980s and 1990s, 
when European legislation sought to abolish them to enhance boards as a controlling 
mechanism of corporate governance (Montgomery, 1989). 
Charity boards, by contrast, are made up entirely of outsiders. That means they have 
similarities to the two-tier board structures common in continental Europe (Maassen & van 
den Bosch, 1999). Such structures enhance the “control” role of boards and protect against 
capture. Whether that constraint has practical significance is a question for empirical 
investigation (see Saj, 2013, for a discussion of director/executive collaboration). Directors’ 
oversight can be neutralised through executives’ manipulation of information flows (Bezemer, 
Peij, de Kruijs, & Maassen, 2014). 
Charities often attract the great-and-good to their boards, people who can open doors to 
donations or smooth the way to winning state funding. Such directors serve their charities 
much as listed companies collected “trophy directors” in the years before Enron collapsed 
(Dobrzynski, 1996).  
But charity trustees in Britain are not just figureheads. They are legally directors, who 
attest to director duties described in the 2006 Companies Act, which bind them to “promote 
the success of the company in the interests of its members as a whole” while having “regard” 
to the interests of other stakeholders (UK Parliament, 2006, Section 172.1). The term 
“members”, through centuries of precedent, means the owners of the business, the 
shareholders in normal companies. The roles of director and member are therefore legally 
distinct. Directors have a duty to members, perhaps their primary duty. They have unlimited, 
personal liability. By contrast, members’ liability is limited (depending on the terms of 
incorporation), for which they are granted limited rights. They receive reports from the 
directors, but they do not automatically have a voice on policy, except indirectly through their 
right to appoint directors. But members are, in law, the principals; directors are their agents. 
Members have the right to elect the directors; directors have a fiduciary duty to members.  
Agency and stewardship 
These distinctions point to another part of the charity board puzzle that links back a key 
theoretical governance debate (Bernstein, Buse, & Bilimoria, 2016): Is executive and board 
behaviour better described by agency theory or the contradictory arena of stewardship?  
Agency theory (Fama, 1980) assumes economic actors will act in self-interested ways. 
Agents may not share the interests of principals and can exploit information asymmetries to 
divert corporate resources for personal gain. To align individual behaviour with organisational 
goals requires a two-pronged approach: incentives for managers that are congruent with the 
organisation’s aspirations, and hierarchical mechanisms to monitor them and control their 
actions. In the non-profit sector, Coule (2015) observes that principal-agent assumptions can 
drive narrow views of accountability. Dent (2014), however, argues that non-profits are, in 
effect, owner-less organisations; their boards are self-perpetuating. If boards act as the sole 
point of accountability, then direction and action rests with officers, not directors, leading to 
“generally abysmal” governance (Dent, 2014).  
But agency theory is only one way of considering governance. Stewardship theory, by 
contrast, sees individuals as acting, in the main, in line with the organisation’s goals, motivated 
by a collectivist, social approach, seeking to satisfy higher needs of self-esteem and personal 
fulfilment (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997). Its conclusions are the opposite of agency 
theory. Let people get on with the job. Trust them; don’t monitor constantly. This 
accountability is interpersonal, horizontal, and enacted as much through peers as supervisors. 
Agency theory predicts a self-interested struggle over who controls resources, irrespective 
of property rights. Stewardship theory, by contrast, assumes a pro-social attitude, collaboration 
not contestation, and a sense of duty to others in the use of resources, not just respect for rights.  
This brings us back to the problem outlined at the start of this essay. In implementing our 
new articles, was not I, as director, and we as a board, depriving members of their rights? Did 
this action take away their “property”, in some sense, even if members have no rights to the 
assets of a business? Was our high-minded attempt to relieve absent members of any 
reputational risk a high-handed disregard of members’ interests? Was this perhaps more an 
example of an agency problem that boards were meant to counter, than an example of the 
stewardship directors should show to the members whose interests they are meant to defend? 
Or is this just a definitional storm in an intellectual teacup, a meaningless piece of mental 
gymnastics? Do charities have what we usually call “owners”?    
The experience 
For one of the charities I serve, let’s call it CareSW, life began following the 1990 National 
Health Service and Care in the Community Act. Starting with 1980s reforms by the 
Conservative government under Margaret Thatcher, such “care in the community” introduced 
market pressure for the sake of efficiency (Andrews & Phillips, 2000). It was an element of 
what has been called the New Public Management (Ferlie, Ashburner, Fitzgerald, & Pettigrew, 
1996). But it solved a governance issue too: In providing and regulating care, states faced an 
agency conflict. Community care places delivery with outside organisations (including 
charities) instead, while the state retains oversight. The conflict goes away. But states have 
another conflict – as customer of the regulated service – which proved too big a problem to 
solve directly. That is why regulators are constituted as notionally independent of government.  
The other charity, we’ll refer to it as ArtsSW, has a different background. It arose for the 
sake of operating a large, diversified performance venue, replacing government bureaucrats 
with professional arts managers. Its charitable status allows the venue to undertake risky 
ventures, such as a) letting new or less-well known producers put on shows likely to serve 
only narrow audiences, or b) working with schools or other charities to bring arts-focused 
projects to people with life problems. To cover the gap, ArtsSW also stages commercial 
productions and hosts conventions and trade shows. Between the two extremes lies the bulk 
of the output of popular arts: classical music, touring theatre companies, and movies that draw 
reasonable crowds. This interest in and reliance upon commercially oriented productions is in 
line with what McKay, Moro, Teasdale, and Clifford (2015) call the marketisation of non-
profits.  
CareSW needs its director-trustees to provide the commercial experience, legal and 
compliance advice, and financial acumen to supplement the skills the largely care-focused 
management team. The management team draws extensively on the directors, with joint 
board/management working groups on major projects and tight liaison between the CEO and 
chair.  
ArtsSW needs commercial ideas, too, though more as a sounding board for the boundary-
spanning discussed in the literatures of entrepreneurship (Zott & Amit, 2007), top-
management teams (Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997), corporate and public governance (van 
Meerkerk & Edelenbos, 2018), and charities (Duncan & Schoor, 2015). It helps to have 
directors well-connected to local government, prominent in local education circles, or with 
ties to the national arts scene. Such individuals open doors to valuable and scarce resources, 
as resource dependency theory suggests (Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000). ArtsSW needs 
help with control as well. But its monitoring is also a “service” function – for example, 
financial ideas as well as warnings – which suggests the distinction theoreticians draw between 
“service” and “control” is less pronounced in the lived experience of boards.  
At CareSW, directors are deeply engaged with – though not directly involved in – the 
business. Joint board-management working parties lead directors to interact with mid- and 
lower managers, as well as the senior management, with learning spreading in both directions. 
Individual directors frequently visit the properties that CareSW manages, speaking to service 
users and frontline staff. Nearly all the directors have personal experience of the types of care 
offered, through relatives or friends or in prior work, which heightened their engagement. That 
means that emotional bonds to the mission (if perhaps not the organisation) pre-date 
appointment and then strengthen through the board work. As a result, directors deepen their 
personal connection to the charity even as they deliver intellectual input to strategy, control 
and compliance.  
At ArtsSW, directors are less engaged. They might attend more shows than they would 
otherwise and act as flag-wavers when dignitaries from local government or national arts 
funders visited. Managers encourage them to let friends know of special events, in the hope 
that their enjoyment might lead to donations or end-of-life legacies. Some deliver “service” in 
ways similar to those at CareSW, working with mid- and lower level staff on projects. In short, 
directors served the company more as ambassadors than as controllers. 
What I see in both organisations are individuals who come to serve on the boards out of 
psychological attachment to the work of the charity, more affective than cognitive. Moreover, 
this psychological commitment is of a moral nature (Greene & Haidt, 2002).  
Listed companies win investors as shareholders (i.e. members) through their attractiveness 
as producers of dividends and capital gains. But charities appeal for donor-funds and would-
be directors because what they do provides society with goods that markets cannot deliver.  
Listed companies attract outside directors for the status it confers and the chance to be 
involved with a financial success. These charities attract directors for similar reasons, and 
perhaps even for vainglorious ones. And it is easier to get appointed as a paid director of a 
listed company board if you have already served on an unpaid major charity board. That is, 
the motivation of charities directors is not entirely altruistic, suggesting altruism and the self-
serving are hard to separate (Segal & Lehrer, 2012).  
Listed and private companies have non-executive directors with incentives to act in self-
interested ways, but also personal reputational risk that leads them to exercise control, 
addressing the agency problem in corporate governance. By contrast, at charities the lack of 
remuneration and intellectual as well as emotional engagement of directors often pre-dates 
work with the organisation. That is, this antecedent to stewardship (Hernandez, 2012) is often 
precedes both charity board directorship and membership. The risk of such work presenting 
an agency problem is diminished, even if directors’ motivation is not entirely other-directed 
and aimed at collective benefit, as the literature on stewardship might suggest. 
Stewardship and accountability 
These observations lead me to think that there is something similar between the 
stewardship exhibited by employees and even senior managers (Davis et al., 1997) and the 
way directors of charities approach their (largely unpaid) work. Hernandez (2012) suggests 
that the collectivist approach and self-sacrifice in stewardship within corporations arise 
through structural factors in control and reward systems that together engender cognitive 
mechanisms that are other-regarding and oriented to the long-term. In corporations, rewards 
can be based on self-efficacy and self-determination, and control systems can promote 
collaboration and collective responsibility. If so, then they also contribute to building affective 
commitment. Enacting these cognitive and affective mechanisms builds psychological 
ownership, which leads to stewardship behaviour (Hernandez, 2012). 
Psychological ownership has been seen empirically in studies of employee actions in 
situations in which the workforce has had rewards based on equity stakes – share options or 
other equity-based pay (Pierce & Rodgers, 2004). Similar observations have been made about 
people who choose to work in charities (Benz, 2005). These conditions induce commitment to 
organisational goals, leading to greater immediate efficiency and effectiveness through self-
development in the direction of the organisation. This is especially true when psychological 
ownership is combined with legal ownership, or at least the claim of future legal rights that 
options represent.  
Since the financial crisis, policy in the corporate sector has been striving to replicate such 
commitment among institutional investors, as seen in the UK Stewardship Code (FRC, 2012), 
a measure copied in many other countries (for discussion of an example, see Chiu, 2016). But 
scholars and practitioners have doubts about whether market actors could ever operate in that 
way (Reisberg, 2015). In their analysis of the possibility of investor stewardship, McNulty and 
Nordberg (2016) suggest psychological ownership is needed to create the conditions for the 
long-term orientation and collaboration of investor and companies the code envisaged. But 
their model of active ownership also demonstrated the array of impediments that might prevent 
it, not least that affective commitment arises after legal ownership, when the investors already 
hold the rights, and because engagement involves considerable costs.  
The situation at charities is, however, fundamentally different. As discussed above, 
“members” of a charity – that is, the holders of the legal ownership – often have affective and 
cognitive commitment to the cause of the charity before they become member-directors. In 
social-health care charities, many directors have psychological ownership through relatives 
with the problems the charities address. In arts charities, many have affection for the outputs 
of the artists, have artists in the family, or have worked in the arts. In both, psychological 
ownership seems to pre-date their legal status, and a “service” orientation, with its forward-
looking focus on innovation, is embedded prior to appointment (see Figure 1). Unlike investors 
in capital markets, and more like investors in family-controlled firms (Cannella, Jones, & 
Withers, 2015), member-directors identify with the company, reinforcing psychological 
ownership. Moreover, in charities, both psychological and legal ownership are separated from 
financial arrangements. Charity member-directors are, so to speak, deeply interested in the 
business even if they have no interest in it. 
 When directors of a charity are also its members, then they are accountable, directly, only 
to themselves. That is not to say they are unaccountable, however. Regulators provide for 
charities something of the upwards accountability that corporations get from owners. And they 
can fire each other, if they choose to, as I did, in effect, by telling non-director members I 




Figure 1 - 'Member' stewardship through ownership, investor vs. trustee-members 
But that assumes that accountability is always hierarchical. Roberts (2001) argues that in 
practice we find horizontal as well as vertical accountability. The vertical variety is associated 
with power over rewards and punishment; it “individualises”, and it can operate at a distance. 
The horizontal variety is associated with repeated interaction over long periods; it “socialises”, 
and it operates in intimate circumstances. Similarly, and in the setting of health care, the 
O'Neill (2002) argues that accountability of the regulatory type, against targets, was often 
counter-productive. Instead she advocates the importance of “intelligent accountability”, the 
interpersonal variety, dependent on relationships and openness.   
Discussion and research agenda on charity boards 
Charity boards may be accountable only to themselves, but directors are accountable to 
each other. As members, they elect new directors and can dismiss others. As directors, they 
face dismissal or being outvoted or ignored through the “intelligent accountability” of the 
judgement of peers. If this is the case, however, then it does not preclude groupthink (Janis, 
1972; Whyte, 1952/2012) from arising through excessive deference. Let us consider then what 
research might teach us about what happens, and ought to happen. 
An empirical agenda – who is in charge? 
Who is in charge, empirically, in charities? While boards are constitutionally separate 
from management, they are not necessarily in a strong position to monitor management or 
contribute to resource provision. So, do charity boards work in the way, with the same benefits 
to “control” and downsides to information flow, that supervisory boards do in the two-tier 
boards in continental Europe? Information flows are controlled by the executives. A 
confrontational stance by the board might be punished by executives withholding important 
information, ignoring board directives, or leaving for more remunerative work. Given their 
lack of financial interest in the outcomes, to what extent and in what ways do charity boards 
exercise their structural power over management? To what extent do charity boards meet in 
camera, without the executives present, and if so, what issues do they consider?  
Who is charge within the boardroom? Studies of corporate boards suffer from the “black 
box” phenomenon owing to a lack of access, but the accounts we have suggest there is a 
mixture of collaboration and bullying, mutual respect and intimidation, coalitions and cliques. 
In corporate boards, Leblanc and Gillies (2005) found that persuasiveness was central to 
director effectiveness. In a very rare case of observation research using video recording, 
Bezemer, Nicholson, and Pugliese (2018) found the chair’s approach was decisive, though 
with a twist: active involvement of the chair in debates tends to hinder engagement of other 
directors. That hints at a need for chairs to engage in non-traditional modes of leadership: 
shared (Bolden, 2011) or servant (van Dierendonck, 2011). These studies suggest parallels in 
charity governance, as well as a way of understanding the puzzle with which this article began, 
the rights of “members” and their psychological ownership. 
Are “members” ever in charge? Notionally, members in UK law hold legal ownership, but 
in the case of charities without financial interest and without right to use the company’s 
resources. Regulators can withdraw charitable status and thus impede any actions of members, 
so what significance does membership have? Moreover, how does their lack of financial 
interest of members or member-directors affect their cognitive engagement? If the 
psychological ownership pre-dates the legal, how does affective commitment to the cause 
influence development of cognitive engagement with the business? Is effectiveness of the 
trustee the same as effectiveness as director? How might affective commitment impair 
development of the critical edge needed to conduct monitoring? And under what conditions 
are charity directors committed to the work, engaged in ways short of commitment, or just 
performing the basics?  
This paper has addressed only tangentially the emergence of hybrid organisations often 
called social enterprises, working in the same general areas that charities inhabit. Here the 
sense of ownership is probably more palpable, as the founders work with a profit motive, and 
investors have at least a residual claim on the assets if somewhat less power over direction of 
the business than they would in conventional corporations. This is an area calling out for 
greater research. In keeping with this paper’s direction, that includes assessing how, at the 
outset, psychological ownership and stewardship, on the one hand, and legal ownership and 
agency on the other, interact. We might also consider how those relationships develop over 
time.  
A normative agenda – in whose interest?  
Other issues arise about the functioning of charity boards and how they might be more 
effective. Let me articulate one before moving on to the most important issue of all – in whose 
interest? 
The question of effective boards is an important topic in normative literature on corporate 
governance. Forbes and Milliken (1999) emphasise processes; Zahra and Pearce (1989) 
structures; and Samra-Fredericks (2000) directors’ psychological and interpersonal qualities. 
Cornforth (2001) translates such concerns into the charitable sector, creating a list of 
characteristics of effective charity boards. Heemskerk, Heemskerk, and Wats (2015) link 
effectiveness in the non-profit sector to behavioural factors.  
More recently, the policy agenda in corporate governance has emphasised the importance 
of board evaluation as a tool of assessing effectiveness (Nordberg & Booth, 2019). But 
evaluation is time-consuming, and volunteer directors of charitable companies may think they 
have done enough. Moreover, for charitable ones, the cost could tip finances into deficit. What 
can – what should – charities do to ensure their boards work better? If this policy direction is 
seen as an imperative, what other mechanisms can the sector or the state find to make the 
process easier to conduct?  
And in whose interest do we do this? The simple answer is the one that figures only in 
corners of this paper, so far, and in the literature only generally: the beneficiaries. The purpose 
of regulators is to set the rules and ensure that actors play by them. In commercial settings, 
that means they operate to ensure the counterparty in a market transaction can count on the 
other side fulfilling its obligations, and to mitigate the effects of power imbalances that might 
make the market less efficient.  
But charities operate where markets do not work particularly well. Here the regulators 
pick up some of the slack in governance, concerning deficiencies in markets. Do their actions 
on behalf of beneficiaries also make up for the governance deficit when the distinction 
between boards and owners collapses? Are regulators – at considerable distance from the 
service delivery – well enough equipped to represent beneficiaries’ interests?  
In “arts”, the underprivileged may miss out on the benefits of the experience of art, and 
that artists may lose the ability to develop their talent. In “care”, the main problems arise in 
the lack of attention – the lack of care – in the day-to-day actions, where regulators seem ill-
equipped to intervene promptly, allowing the sort of scandals noted at the start of this paper 
to arise.  
So, how should charity boards ensure the voice of the beneficiary is heard? Given power 
imbalances, the confidentiality due to beneficiaries, and the reasons why their concerns cannot 
be addressed by markets, it is important that boards do something. Exploratory research into 
what happens now, what works and doesn’t, might well help us to work out what ought to be 
done.  
Reflections in lieu of conclusions 
The two specific problems sketched the start of this paper – the spotlight on Oxfam, the 
cloud over the social care sector – set a context that makes palpable the social issues we face 
in situations where markets fail. Charities perform important services for society, services that 
markets alone probably would not provide, and services that, increasingly since the 1980s, the 
state has declined to provide, at least directly. The New Public Management approach may be 
ideological, but there is something in its argument that the state is too distant to deal such 
cases, and it has a conflict of interest when in charge of both delivery and regulation. That 
suggests a need for more granular, personalised accountability. 
In this paper I articulate some of the gaps in the understanding. The research it proposes 
will help us come closer to solutions to the puzzle I posed at the outset. What I think is true is 
this: that charities are different, that they require more of the attention to governance that the 
corporate sector has received, and that they are unlikely to get it for the same reasons of market 
failure that affect their service delivery.  
Charities draw on hand-me-downs in governance thinking, the way that charity shops deal 
in hand-me-down clothes and personal belongings. It is likely to remain that way unless 
stewardship takes a stronger hold on our scholarship. We need better research and study, which 
can inform a stronger education for charity trustee-director-members. 
 
i This phrase resounded in the aftermath of the collapse of Enron Corp. in 2001; see MacAvoy 
(2003). 
ii For a detailed discussion of “reasonableness” in corporate governance theory, see Nordberg (2018). 
 
iii This paper uses the terms “trustee” and “director” essentially as the same thing with respect to 
charity boards. The title “director” in UK company law applies to someone who sits on the board of 
any type of company. The term “trustee” in English law refers to someone given control over assets 
in trust for one or more beneficiaries or for charitable purposes.  
iv According to the National Council of Voluntary Organisations, the trade association for the 
charitable sector in the UK, “social services” and “cultural and recreation” in 2018 were the two 
largest subsectors, ranked by both employment and income. See 
https://data.ncvo.org.uk/profile/activities/#by-subsector. Accessed July 22, 2020. 
v One justification for organisations, a hierarchical form of governance, is the inefficiencies of 
markets (Williamson, 1973). 
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